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Abstract. This paper is about control mechanisms for virtual organizations. As a
case study, we discuss the Renewables Obligation (RO), a control mechanism that
was introduced in the United Kingdom to stimulate the production of renewable
energy. We apply a conceptual model based on normative multiagent systems
(NMAS). We propose to model both the participants and the normative system as
autonomous agents, having beliefs and goals. Norms, which can be internalized
by the agents as obligations, are translated into conditional beliefs and goals of
the normative system, which concern both detection and sanctioning measures.
We show that the model can handle both the regulative and the evidential aspects
of the case.
1 Introduction
Recent developments in the areas of computer supported collaborative work, distrib-
uted knowledge management and ‘grid’ architectures for sharing resources and compu-
tational services have lead to an increasing interest in what has been termed a virtual
organization: a collection of enterprizes or organizations that need to coordinate across
organizational boundaries [23, 27, 26]. A crucial aspect of virtual organizations is that
participants are autonomous: they can join and leave, and although some participants
are more powerful than others, there is no central authority that can completely impose
its will. Joining a virtual organization may provide benefits which participants could not
achieve by themselves. On the other hand, participants must trust other participants not
to behave opportunistically. To create a sustainable network, participants must there-
fore observe some general norms about what constitutes accepted behavior. In the case
of computational coordination infrastructures, such norms will have to be enforced au-
tomatically, by means of electronic data interchange protocols or web services [21].
That means that norms will have to be encoded explicitly, in the form of some specific
control mechanism [17, 6]. Ideally, a control mechanism is evaluated before it is imple-
mented. To facilitate the specification and evaluation of control mechanism, we need a
conceptual model that allows us to reason about the expected behavior of participants
when they are subjected to norms in a virtual organization.
We discuss a case study of an actual control mechanism, the Renewables Obliga-
tion (RO), which was introduced in the United Kingdom to stimulate the production of
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energy from renewable sources [20]. The ruling involves an obligation for energy sup-
pliers to produce evidence of having distributed a certain minimal amount of renewable
energy. In case energy producers do not comply, a buy-out fee must be paid. This is an
example of a so called regulative rule. To present evidence of the amount of renewable
energy produced, suppliers use so called Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs).
This shows the use of a so called constitutive rule. The ROCs can be traded freely. The
whole process is administered by a special agency, called OfGEM, with several tasks. It
must monitor the amount of ROCs presented by suppliers, to detect whether the oblig-
ation has not been breached. If so, it must collect the penalty. OfGEM also accredits
those renewable energy producers that are allowed to issue ROCs. This shows the use
of a delegation mechanism.
Because of the inherent autonomy of participants and the lack of central control, the
conceptual models used to design and reason about virtual organizations are likely to
be similar to the kinds of models used in agent-oriented software engineering [9, 28, 8].
Typically, such models speak of an organizational structure involving agents that ful-
fill tasks on the basis of the organizational roles they play. Because agents may have
conflicting tasks, or even conflicting individual goals, the possible behavior of agents
is restricted by social norms. Although the RO case is not about computational agents
as such, the network of energy producers does form a virtual organization. Energy pro-
ducers share a network on which they have to coordinate energy distribution. There is a
global objective, to produce more renewable energy, but the government is not in a po-
sition to force all energy producers to make the initial investments involved. Therefore
a control mechanism is introduced, that should achieve the global objective indirectly.
So in both cases we are dealing with a form of mechanism design: a control mechanism
is designed in such a way, that the resulting agent society or virtual organization will
uphold a general norm, and thus be able to sustain itself.
In this paper we therefore present a style of conceptual modeling based on normative
multiagent systems (NMASs). Normative multiagent systems are ”sets of agents (human
or artificial) whose interactions can fruitfully be regarded as norm-governed; the norms
prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not behave. [...] Importantly, the
norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal,
i.e., that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [13]. The idea is
to model all parties involved by autonomous agents: agents that are free to determine
their courses of action, based on their interests (goals) and on their current information
about the world (beliefs). Norms govern the behavior of agents, based on the roles they
occupy in a virtual organization. A crucial aspect of our approach is that in principle
any decision making entity can be modeled as an autonomous agent. In particular, the
normative system itself can be viewed as an autonomous agent too, with specific beliefs
and goals [5, 4]. The model has also been applied to other case studies. In particular, it
has been used to explain issues of trust in electronic commerce [3].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we give a brief
description of the RO case. In section 3 we define our version of normative multiagent
systems, and illustrate it by two examples. In section 4 we then show how the RO
case can be modeled using normative multiagent systems. The paper ends with lessons
learned from this modeling exercise.
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2 Case Description: Renewables Obligation
An example of an actual control mechanism is provided by the Renewables Obligation
case [20, 14]. In order to comply with international environmental agreements, such
as the Kyoto protocol, governments implement different incentive schemes, to stim-
ulate the generation and supply of ‘renewable energy’. Research and development of
renewable energy generating technologies such as wind turbines, photovoltaic panels,
hydro-electric power generators, and others, require high initial investments by energy
producers. Therefore the production costs of renewable energy are higher than those
of the energy produced by conventional means. The incentive scheme implemented in
Great Britain, starting from April 2002, is based on the Renewables Obligation (RO)
[20]. This is a legal obligation on all licensed electricity suppliers to produce evidence
that they have supplied a percentage target of their electricity from renewable energy
sources to customers in Great Britain. A special organization, the Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets (OfGEM), a branch of the official regulator of the British Gas and
Electricity markets, has been set up to manage the scheme.
Suppliers are required to produce evidence to OfGEM of their compliance with the
RO. An important evidence token is the so-called Renewables Obligation Certificate
(ROC). A ROC is received by the supplier when it buys electricity from an accred-
ited renewable producer. A ROC can also be traded. Because electricity can be added,
bought and sold as a commodity, it does not matter which supplier actually produces the
ROCs, and which supplier buys them. This has led to the development of a market for
ROCs. If the target number of ROCs increases, the total number of renewable energy in
the system will increase, which was the objective of the scheme.
So suppliers can meet their Renewables Obligation in three ways. They can produce
ROCs corresponding to the target level, expressed as a percentage of all electricity
supplied to customers in Great Britain; they can use a so called buy-out clause which
allows them to pay £30.51/Mwh for any shortfall below the target level, or they can
use a combination of ROCs and buy-out fees. If a supplier fails to meet its obligation,
either through ROCs or buy-out payments, the supplier is likely to be in breach of the
Electricity Act, and may be liable to enforcement action. In practice this means that an
additional fine has to be paid. Note that the OfGEM can manipulate the level of the
buy-out fees in such a way that it becomes more beneficial for a supplier to buy the
relatively expensive renewable energy with corresponding ROCs, rather than to violate
the Renewable Obligation.
OfGEM has the authority to accredit electricity producers that are capable of gen-
erating electricity from renewable sources. Such renewable energy producers are sub-
sequently allowed to issue ROCs. By modifying the accreditation criteria, the British
government can make adjustments. For instance, there are plans to extend eligibility to
producers that make use of biomass [16].
The efficiency of the Renewables Obligation has been evaluated and the result is
largely positive: “The large majority of respondents considered that the Obligation
has provided a positive stimulus for investment in renewable technologies, particularly
lower cost technologies such as onshore wind and landfill gas. Most considered that the
Obligation is largely working as anticipated and would deliver a significant expansion
in renewable electricity generation over the coming years.” [16]
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3 Normative Multiagent Systems
We present the basic idea of our version of normative multiagent systems here. For a
more technical exposition, please refer to [5, 4].
The model is based on mental attitudes of agents, like beliefs (information) and goals
(internal motivation), that drive decisions to plan and execute actions. External motiva-
tions, such as social norms or laws, can be represented in the form of obligations, once
they are known and accepted by the agent. Later we show how obligations can again
be reduced to goals of the individual agent and the normative system, using violation
conditions and sanctions.
Mental attitudes of agents are represented in a logical representation language. The
logic allows us to derive what other mental attitudes can be inferred from the specifica-
tion of the agents, and what not. When the rules of the model are implemented, we can
run simulations of the decision making of various agents.
3.1 Mental Attitudes
In our logic, the mental attitudes are not represented as sets of sentences as is custom-
ary, but as sets of conditionals or production rules. This expresses the fact that mental
attitudes are context dependent [12]. So each attitude Bel, Goal, etc., is represented
by a set of rules of the form A → B, where both A and B are formulas, composed of
facts by means of logical operators ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not) and the constant  (always
true). Here A represents the conditions under which the facts represented by B may be
inferred by the agent. Moreover, B may contain special decision variables, also called
actions, that will alter the state of the world. The values of decision variables are under
the control of the agent. For simplicity, both facts and decision variables are represented
by boolean variables, being either true or false. The decision making process of an agent
is represented by a forward reasoning loop, which runs roughly as follows1.
The agent receives input from observations, represented as a set of facts S. Alterna-
tively, the agent may start with a set of initial goals, represented by a set of decision
variables S. Now the agent tries to match each rule A → B against S. If A is contained
in S, and the facts of B do not contradict a fact in S, the rule is applicable. However,
there may be several rules applicable to S, from the same and from different mental
attitudes, each with a different possible outcome. Using a priority ordering, the agent
selects one rule – this is called conflict resolution – and applies it: the result B is now
added to S. This process continues, until a stable set of facts is reached, to which no
further additions can be made. Such a stable set, an extension, represents one of the
possible outcomes of the decision making.
The decision making behavior of an agent crucially depends on the way the conflicts
among the mental attitudes are resolved. Different priority orders may lead to different
extensions, which represent sets of goals and hence lead to different behavior.
Example 1 (Beer and Smoking.). An agent has the following inclination. Whenever it
finds itself at a party, it wants to drink beer. And whenever it is drinking beer, it needs a
1 Technical details of the reasoning is expressed using input/output logics [18]. Their application
to Normative Multiagent Systems is explained in [5, 4].
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cigarette. The agent knows that smoking is bad, and therefore the agent has the intention
not to smoke. What will happen?
Belief: at party
Goal 1: at party → drink beer
Goal 2: drink beer → smoke cigarette
Goal 3: ¬ smoke cigarette
What will happen depends on the relative strength of the agent’s urge to smoke and its
resolution not to. These relative strengths can be expressed by a priority ordering on
sets of rules. Rules in one set are considered equally important. In general, belief rules
outrank goal rules; otherwise the agent would suffer from wishful thinking [7]. There
are two possibilities. If the urge to smoke is too strong, and the agent has already drunk
a beer, it will smoke despite its resolution not to. But if the resolution outranks the urge,
the agent will refrain from smoking, or refrain both from drinking and smoking.
Priority: Belief > {Goal 1, Goal 2} > Goal 3
Outcome: {at party, drink beer, smoke cigarette}
Priority: Belief > Goal 3 > {Goal 1, Goal 2}
Outcomes: {at party, drink beer } , { at party}
What do we observe in this example? Before trying to achieve its goals, an agent
will consider the previously derived goals in the extension along with their conse-
quences. This process is called goal generation [7]. Goal generation precedes the plan-
ning process. Roughly, there are two kinds of goals. Achievement goals are satisfied
once some state of affairs has been realized. An example is the goal to reach some
location. Maintenance goals on the other hand, are only satisfied for as long as some
state of affairs continues to hold. Consider for example the goal to maintain some safety
standard.
3.2 Norms and Obligations
Now what about norms and obligations? Some people have observed that the stabilizing
effect of goals for individual agents, is similar to the stabilizing effects of norms on a
community of agents. Norms protect long term interests of the group against individual
deviators. But how can we model norms in this setting?
The general idea is to use a reduction of obligations to goals of the normative system,
where the normative system itself is seen as a separate agent. This may be summarized
by the slogan “Your wish is my command”: the wishes of the normative system count
as commands for the individual agent, provided that the normative system has authority
over the individual agents.
The reduction makes use of a so called violation predicate [1]. Although violation
predicates have been known for a long time, making a reduction to goals rather than to
modal or epistemic operators, does make a difference. It expresses that the normative
agent makes a conscious decision to detect or sanction a violation. Violation detection
is a specific kind of goal of the normative system. It may lead to the addition of a belief
in case a violation is indeed detected. Violation detection is separated from sanctioning.
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Sanctioning concerns the decision to sanction an agent in case a violation has been
detected, and what sanction is most appropriate.
To make sure that obligations are translated correctly, a number of conditions must
be observed [4].
Definition 1 (Conditional Obligations). Agent a is obliged to bring about x under
sanction s in circumstances C, with respect to a normative system n in a given model
M , written as M |= Oa−n(x, s|C), iff:
1. Goal of n: C → x
If agent n believes that C, then it has as a goal that x should be brought about.
2. Goal of n: C ∧ ¬x → V iol(¬x)
If agent n believes that C and ¬x is the case, then it has the goal V iol(¬x), i.e., to
recognize ¬x as a violation by agent a.
3. Goal of n: ¬V iol(¬x)
By itself, agent n has no goal for violations. This is to prevent arbitrary detection.
4. Goal of n: C ∧ V iol(¬x) → s
If agent n believes that C and detects V iol(¬x), then it has as a goal to apply
sanction s.
5. Goal of n: ¬s
By itself, agent n does not have a goal to apply sanction s. This is to prevent arbi-
trary sanctions.
6. Goal of a: ¬s
Agent a has a goal not be sanctioned. Without this condition, the sanction would
not deter agent a from violating the obligation.
Example 2 (Common-Pool Resources). Consider the following situation. There is a
group of agents A = {a1, .., an} that share access to a common pool resource R.
Think for example of common fishing grounds, which may suffer from overfishing in
spring [22]. Only if all fishermen have a modest spring catch, the fish stocks can be
sustained. For this reason, a normative system is set up, with a norm that in spring, no
fisherman is allowed to catch more than some predetermined quota2.
The model Mpool is set up as follows. We use boolean variables ‘spring’ to represent the
fact that it is now spring, ‘overfish’, which stands for fishing more than the quota allow,
and ‘fine’ for the penalty that must be paid. Variable a ranges over agents a1, .., an.
Now we have an obligation of agent a towards the community, not to overfish in spring
against the penalty of paying a fine. Using definition 1, this obligation can be modeled
as follows.
Mpool |= Oa−n(¬overfish, fine|spring), if and only if:
1. Goal of n: spring → ¬ overfish
2. Goal of n: spring ∧ overfish → V iol(overfish)
3. Goal of n: ¬V iol(overfish)
2 Such cases have been studied extensively in economics, for example using evolutionary game
theory. See for example [25]. Our example is only meant for illustrative purposes.
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4. Goal of n: spring ∧ V iol(overfish) → fine
5. Goal of n: ¬ fine
6. Goal of a: ¬ fine
In addition to these aspects of the norm, we must also model the usual beliefs and goals
of an agent. In particular, we must model the fact that without the obligation, overfishing
is profitable. This aspect is modeled here by a simple goal. Moreover, for the sake of
simulation, let us suppose that it is now spring and that everybody believes this.
7. Goal of a: overfish
8. Belief of a, n: spring
3.3 Recursive Modeling
How are these rules applied? Suppose it is spring and agent a has a goal to overfish.
Agent a also has a goal not be fined. So we get an initial extension of the form {spring,
overfish, ¬ fine}. Because the consequences are to a large part controlled by other
agents, agent a will try and predict the goals and actions of other agents. It applies
all the rules it knows that other agents possess, including those of the normative agent
n. A set of rules of another agent is called a profile. Crucially, profiles contain rules that
are affected by the actions of the agent itself. That is why we call this process recur-
sive modeling. However, for most applications no infinite recursion is needed; recursive
models up to three levels of embedding are quite sufficient.
In the first step, a applies n’s rule 2 to its own initial extension, which will trigger
a goal to detect a violation. On the other hand, n has goal 3 not to detect violations.
Which of these will get priority depends on a’s profile of n. Lets assume that a believes
that n’s conditional goal to report a violation outranks its general goal not to detect
violations. That will produce an extension { spring, overfish, V iol(overfish), ¬ fine}.
In the second step, a applies n’s goal 4 to sanction, weighed against n’s goal 3 not
to sanction. If a believes that n’s goal not to sanction outweighs its goal to sanction, for
example because of prohibitive costs of sanctioning, a will form the goal to overfish. But
if a believes n will indeed punish detected overfishing, this would produce an extension
{ spring, overfish, V iol(overfish), fine, ¬ fine}, which contains a contradiction. This
conflict will have to be resolved by a’s own priority order. In case the goal not to be fined
outweighs the goal to overfish – in practice: if the penalty is larger than the expected
profits – the agent will not form a goal to overfish.
The example shows that an obligation will only work, if two conditions are met. First,
the sanction must outweigh the benefits of overfishing. In our model we can express this
by a priority constraint.
Goal of a: ¬ fine > Goal of a: overfish
Second, the perceived chances of being detected and fined, must be sufficiently high. In
our model we can express this by adding priority constraints to the profiles of n used
by a during recursive modeling.
Goal of n: (spring ∧ V iol(overfish) → fine) > Goal of n: ¬ fine
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Thus a lot depends on the enforcement mechanism. Because the normative system,
embodied by the village council for example, has no physical power, violation detection
and sanctioning must be delegated to specific agents, such as a police force. There
are examples of self-organizing communities in which these tasks are performed by
ordinary community members, who may even behave altruistically, in the sense that
they are not compensated for their detection and punishing efforts [22].
3.4 Constitutive Norms
So how do we model the fish quota? Suppose there is an accepted belief among the
fishing community that a catch of more than two tonnes a week ‘counts as’ overfishing.
The idea is to use constitutive norms [24] to model such general beliefs of the com-
munity. A constitutive norm applies only under certain circumstances and is intimately
linked to an institution. This institution can be a (legal) person or an abstract entity such
as a community of users. Whether a rule applies depends on the jurisdiction of the in-
stitution. In case we have a normative system, we can re-apply index n to stand for the
institution. Thus constitutive rules are of the form “x counts as y under circumstances
C in institution n”.
In the example, the quota for overfishing in spring can be expressed as a belief rule
of the institution n, and all agents a that fall under its jurisdiction.
Belief of a, n: spring ∧ (weekly catch > 2 tonnes) → overfish
Constitutive norms can create new institutional facts. The prototypical example is a
declarative speech act [2]. For example, the utterance “I name this ship Johanna”, ut-
tered by a lady at an appropriate christening ceremony, will create the institutional
fact of the ship bearing this name. So the right kind of utterance uttered by the right
person under the right circumstances ‘counts as’ as the creation of an institutional
fact.
3.5 Value Objects
One way to express that objects represent a value in a community of agents, is as a
goal to obtain such objects, attributed to an abstract agent that represents the shared
conventions in the community. Just like beliefs can capture ‘counts as’ rules, goals
can capture value, up to a point. Note that the attribution of value need not be shared.
There are conventions about what is considered valuable in a community, but the value
that an individual agent attaches to an object is not modeled. In our example, the fact
that overfishing is generally considered profitable, clause 7, is an example of a value
expression.
Goal of a: overfish
Although we do not explicitly model value, as for example [11], the effect of the relative
priority of goals in the recursive simulation and violation games that agents play with
each other, is similar to that of value.
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4 Case Analysis
The case hinges on several aspects. There is a penalty mechanism that creates an in-
centive for energy suppliers to acquire evidence of having distributed a minimal level
of renewable energy to British customers. The supplier has a choice whether to buy the
obligatory amount of “green” energy, to buy ROCs from other suppliers, or else to pay
a buy-out fee that corresponds to the amount of ROCs missing. The penalty aspect can
be modeled by violation detection and sanctioning goals, similar to the obligation in
section 3.
We consider a set of suppliers {s1, .., sn} and the normative system, appropriately
called OfGEM. The main variables of the model MROC are ‘meet target’, which rep-
resents the fact that a supplier has collected enough ROCs, either by selling renewable
energy to customers, or by buying them of other suppliers, ‘buy-out’ which represents
that a supplier must pay a buy-out fee, and ‘enforcement order’ which represents the
sanctioning action of OfGEM in case the Renewables Obligation has been breached.
The normative status of the buy-out fee is interesting. There are two options. On the
one hand, paying a buy-out fee is a legitimate way of conforming to the Renewables
Obligation. A supplier who pays a buy-out fee is not in breach of the law. This would
suggest that there is one obligation, that can be fulfilled in two different ways3:
Os−OfGEM(meet target ∨ buy-out, enforcement order|)
On the other hand, paying a buy-out fee is not the preferred option. The buyer can
choose to pay a buy-out fee, but the penalty level is set by OfGEM in such a way, that
paying the fee is always more expensive than the appropriate number of ROCs would
have been. Hence, we believe that the buy-out fee is better classified as a sanction for
not meeting the target. That suggests that there are in fact two obligations. When the
supplier is in breach of this second obligation, to buy the buy-out fee, OfGEM can call
for a further sanction: an enforcement order. This will force the supplier to pay, against
a penalty of further legal sanctions.
Os−OfGEM(meet target, buy-out|)
Os−OfGEM(¬buy-out, enforcement order|¬meet target)
The first of these clauses is worked out in more detail.
MROC |= Os−OfGEM(meet target, buy-out|), if and only if:
1. Goal of OfGEM: meet target
2. Goal of OfGEM: ¬ meet target → V iol(¬ meet target)
3. Goal of OfGEM: ¬V iol(¬ meet target, a)
4. Goal of OfGEM: ¬ meet target ∧ V iol(¬ meet target) → buy out
5. Goal of OfGEM: ¬ buy out
6. Goal of s: ¬ buy out
Again, we have to state that without the RO scheme, not meeting the target for renew-
able energy would be profitable, because of the initial investments required.
7. Goal of s: ¬ meet target
3 Note that the representation does not account for the fact that a partial shortfall in ROCs may
also be supplemented with a corresponding partial buy-out fee.
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How can we predict the behavior of an average supplier? What matters is the relative
priority of goals 6 and 7. This priority is determined by economic considerations of the
supplier agents. Since renewable energy is much more expensive to purchase for the
supplier than non-renewable energy, the supplier will only consider purchasing renew-
able energy, when the level of the buy-out fee is set high enough. So, if the buy-out
fee is higher than the extra cost for purchasing renewable energy, then the supplier will
prefer 6 to 7. However, if the buy-out fee is less than the extra cost for purchasing re-
newable energy, then the supplier will prefer 7 to 6. A detailed profitability analysis to
determine this preference ordering is beyond the scope of this paper. Detailed tools
exist for such purposes. An example is the e3-value tool [11]. We will investigate the
links with profitability in further research.
Regulative Aspect. The Renewable Obligation will only work, in case some further
conditions are met. First, the probability of being detected must be perceived to be high
by the energy suppliers. Since the ROC scheme makes use of evidential documents
and the burden of proof lies with the suppliers, this condition is taken care of. Second,
the perceived probability of the OfGEM actually collecting buy-out fees, must be high
enough. Currently, buy-out fees flow back into the system. They are used to finance the
OfGEM itself and for other renewable energy stimulation. Thus, it is in the interest of
OfGEM to actually collect buy-out fees. Moreover, if a supplier fails to pay the buy-out
fees, a more severe sanction is invoked. In the ROC case this is called an enforcement
order. The obligation Os−OfGEM(¬buy-out, enforcement order|¬meet target) is mod-
eled analogously to clause 1-7 above.
In the two years that the scheme has been up and running, OfGEM has managed
to collect most buy-out fees that were due. Recently, two electricity suppliers, Atlantic
Electric and Gas Ltd and Maverick Energy Ltd were fined for their likely breach of the
Renewables Obligation. Because both companies went into administrative receivership
(bankruptcy), OfGEM decided not to issue further enforcement orders [19]. This shows
that OfGEM is willing and able to enforce the Renewables Obligation.
Evidential Aspect. The ROC documents provide evidence of a certain amount of energy
having been produced from renewable sources. This evidence is needed for different
control purposes, such as to verify that the energy is indeed from an accredited renew-
able generator, that suppliers meet their Renewables Obligation, and that ROCs keep
their value when traded.
This use of ROC evidence documents can be modeled by specific constitutive rules
of the normative system, in this case embodied by the OfGEM. So OfGEM guarantees
that within the wider community of energy trade, these ROCs ‘count as’ evidence that
renewable energy was produced, and can be traded as such. In our formalization, this
comes out as a simple belief rule of the normative system, and of all relevant suppli-
ers. Similar reasoning holds for the establishment of the target number of ROCs that a
supplier must meet. Note that this target number is relative to the size of the supplier.
Belief of s,OfGEM: 1 ROC → 1 Mwh renewable electricity
Belief of s,OfGEM: x ROC ∧ (x > target) → meet target
OfGEM delegates authority to accredited renewable energy producers. Only accredited
producers are allowed to issue ROCs. The effect of this delegation relation also shows
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as part of the ‘counts as’-rules. Thus, only documents by accredited energy producers
will count as true ROCs.
As long as the OfGEM continues to guarantee the validity of the evidence doc-
uments, these documents themselves can be traded as valuables. The identity of the
holder of a ROC does not matter. For the overall objective of the scheme – to increase
the amount of renewable energy produced – it does not matter whether a ROC or real
renewable energy is traded, since every ROC stands for a certain quantity of renewable
energy having been generated at some point. Because of the existence of a trading mar-
ket, a supplier may specialize. Some, most notably in Scotland, are better at producing
renewable energy; others are better at distributing it.
Other Aspects. Regarding some of the other aspects of the case, like the total flow of
value between parties, and the fact that no ROCs must disappear from the system, our
approach can still benefit from insights of other formalisms. In particular, modeling the
decision of a supplier whether to produce ROCs, buy them or pay the buy-out fee, and in
what relative proportions, would require the use of more detailed profitability analysis
tools. We refer to [14, 15] for an analysis of the case that makes use of the e3-value
method [11], which does provide such quantitative tools. In an extension to e3-value,
called e3-value+, Gordijn and Tan [10] also incorporate aspects of trust and control
into the e3-value approach. A promising direction for further research, is to investigate
further combinations of value-based and normative approaches to virtual organizations.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze how normative systems help create a sustainable network or
virtual organization. Participants can make a choice to participate in a network or not.
When there is no normative structure, participants may suffer from opportunistic be-
havior of others. The example of the common pool resource illustrated how this can
be remedied by a normative system. On the other hand, when too severe a sanction
is imposed, agents may not survive, or leave the network. Thus participants are au-
tonomous in their decision to remain in the network. For this reason, it makes sense to
apply agent-based modeling techniques. In particular, we apply Normative Multiagent
Systems (NMAS) [5, 4]
We model a normative system as an autonomous agent, with explicit beliefs and
goals. Norms are reduced to beliefs and goals of the subjects and the normative system,
according to the slogan “My wish is your command”. Having an explicit agent to repre-
sent the normative system helps in particular to deal with delegation relations, and the
way norm enforcement mechanisms such as detection and sanctions are implemented.
It also makes it possible to explicitly capture the objectives of a norm, namely as the
goals of the normative system.
The normative multiagent systems approach is validated with a case study of the
Renewables Obligation in the United Kingdom. This control mechanism was introduced
to stimulate the production of energy from renewable sources. What lessons did we
learn from this modeling effort?
With respect to the RO case, we learned that the status of the buy-out fee is un-
clear. It can either be regarded as a legitimate way of complying with the Renewables
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Obligation, or as a kind of sanction. The difference comes out clearly in the model.
We choose to model the Renewables Obligation as a combination of two obligations:
one to meet the target, and a second one that is conditional on not meeting the target,
to pay the buy-out fee. This pattern of cascading obligations, in which sanctions are
themselves modeled as regulative rules, is quite common in legal texts. Another lesson
is that evidential documents like ROCs are difficult to capture. They have an ambiva-
lent meaning because they are both evidential documents and value objects that can be
traded themselves.
With respect to the Normative Multiagent Systems approach, we learned that there
are in fact normative systems that need the whole range of concepts to be modeled ac-
curately: beliefs, goals, obligations, violation conditions, sanctions and ‘count as’-rules.
The case study shows that a complex example can be modeled consistently (internal va-
lidity), and that normative multiagent systems can analyze relevant aspects of existing
control mechanisms in a virtual organization (external validity).
The model does have important limitations. First, the underlying representation of
facts and events is too simple. For example, temporal or organizational relationships
can not be conveniently captured. Second, the approach is only qualitative, using rela-
tive comparisons to model priorities. Many applications need a quantitative profitability
analysis to set the right penalty levels, for the incentive scheme to work. But only after a
qualitative analysis has shown the viability of a control mechanism, does it pay to make
a detailed quantitative model.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Vera Kartseva for providing details of the RO case.
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